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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs Siegfried Pollesche and Sheryl Holmes ("Plaintiffs") contracted with
Defendant Mountain Tech Mill & Cabinet ("Mountain Tech / Defendant") to install
kitchen and bathroom cabinets in their home. Mountain Tech delivered defective
cabinets, and the Holmes brought this action against Mountain Tech for breach of
contract and breach of warranty after Mountain Tech failed to correct the problems. The
jury rendered a verdict in their favor. Mountain Tech appeals from three of the trial
court's rulings. Specifically, Mountain Tech challenges the trial judge's decisions to: (1)
refuse to allow Mountain Tech to recall plaintiff Sheryl Holmes as a rebuttal witness; (2)
award plaintiffs' counsel $24,000.00 in attorney's fees; and (3) deny Mountain Tech
attorney's fees.
Because the trial court's rulings on all three issues were proper and because
Mountain Tech has failed to properly preserve its claims for appeal, plaintiffs request that
this court affirm Judge Iwasaki's rulings. In addition, plaintiffs request that this court
award their attorney's fees incurred on appeal.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)0) and § 78-2-2(4).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to allow Mountain Tech

to call plaintiff Sheryl Holmes as a rebuttal witness? A trial judge enjoys considerable
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latitude in determining the admissibility of evidence. A decision whether to admit
rebuttal testimony is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62,
1[19, 29 P.2d 638, 644. Even if erroneous, the trial court's decision may not be
overturned unless it was harmful error. Larsen v. Johnson, 958 P.2d 953, 958 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998) (reversible error is one which undermines confidence in the verdict). See
also Utah R. Evid. 103 ("Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or
excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected....").
2.

Should the trial court's award to plaintiffs of $24,000 in attorney's fees be

affirmed? The question of whether attorney's fees are recoverable is a question of law,
which is reviewed for correctness. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah
1998). However, the question of what constitutes a reasonable attorney's fee is one
respecting which the trial court has considerable discretion. Its decision will be reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. Id. Moreover, an appellate court will uphold the trial court's
decision even if it failed to make explicit findings on the record "whenever it would be
reasonable to assume that the court actually made such findings." Id. at 316.
3.

Should the trial court's decision to deny Mountain Tech's motion for

attorney's fees be affirmed? A trial court's decision that a party is not legally entitled to
attorney's fees is a decision of law, which will be reviewed for correctness. Valcarce,
961 P.2d at 315. However, in order to challenge such a ruling, a party must adequately
preserve its claim for appeal. Meadowbrook LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 117 (Utah
1998).
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DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 (2001), relating to attorney's fees provides:
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails in a civil
action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed
after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written contract,
or other writing allow at least one party to recover attorney's iees.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
This case concerned a contract dispute between plaintiffs Siegfried Pollesche and

Sheryl Holmes and defendant Mountain Tech Mill & Cabinet ("Mountain Tech"). In the
summer of 1996, Mountain Tech agreed to design, construct, and install kitchen and
bathroom cabinets in the plaintiffs' home for $10,066.00. The cabinets arrived
piecemeal, and the plaintiffs found the color of the cabinets to be wrong and the
workmanship substandard. In particular, many of the cabinets had nicks, chattering,
inconsistent staining, and all were constructed of inferior materials. While Mountain
Tech initially promised to remedy these problems, Mountain Tech failed to fix the
cabinets and the plaintiffs were forced to file this action to recover damages for breach of
contract, breach of warranty, and fraud.
Although this case involved a relatively routine contract dispute, the litigation was
anything but ordinary in both the pretrial and trial stages. Initially defendant failed to
timely answer the complaint, and the trial court entered a default judgment. The
defendant eventually was successful in setting aside the default judgment, and filed a
counterclaim for the $1,000.00 remaining contract balance. During discovery, defense
187289.3
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counsel repeatedly failed to comply with discovery deadlines and was sanctioned by the
trial court on at least three separate occasions.
At trial, this suit over a $10,066.00 contract lasted for four days. Eleven witnesses
were called, with seven of them called by Mountain Tech. At the conclusion of trial,
plaintiffs prevailed on all counts. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs on the
breach of contract claim in the amount of $7000.00, and on the breach of warranty claim
in the amount of $2000.00. The jury also returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs on
the defendant's counterclaim.
After trial plaintiffs' counsel submitted an application for a fee award pursuant to
the parties' contract and Utah statute. This application was supported by a detailed
affidavit. Mountain Tech opposed plaintiffs' application and filed its own request for
attorney's fees. The trial court issued specific findings that addressed the merits of
plaintiffs' fee application and the various factors outlined in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken,
764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988). The trial court determined that plaintiffs should be awarded
$24,000.00 in fees. Mountain Tech's fee request was denied. Mountain Tech has
appealed.
n.

Statement of Facts Relevant to Issues Presented for Review
A.

The Contract and Mountain Tech's Failure to Perform*

In July of 1996, plaintiffs Siegfried Pollesche and Sheryl Holmes visited Mountain
Tech's showroom to look for kitchen and bathroom cabinets for their newly-remodeled
home. Michael O'Neal, a sales representative for Mountain Tech, assisted Pollesche and
187289.3
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Holmes. He showed them a display of high-quality hardwood kitchen and bathroom
cabinets. The cabinets appeared to be well made, and the plaintiffs expressed interest in
having the same type of cabinets installed in their home. (Complaint % 5-6, R. 2).
On July 25, 1996, the plaintiffs signed a written agreement under which Mountain
Tech agreed to construct and install kitchen and bathroom cabinets in the plaintiffs' home
at a cost of $10,066.00. The plaintiffs paid $5,000.00 as the initial down payment, with
40% of the purchase price to be paid at the time of delivery, and the remaining 10% to be
paid upon completion of the work. (Complaint f 7, R. 2). Mountain Tech failed to
deliver the cabinets by the contract deadline. However, eventually some, but not all, of
the cabinets were delivered on September 3, 1996. At that time, the plaintiffs paid
Mountain Tech $4,000.00 pursuant to the contract. (Complaint % 10, R. 3).
Although the plaintiffs were informed that the cabinets would be of the same
quality as those in the showroom display, the plaintiffs discovered several defects while
the cabinets were being installed. In particular, the materials used to construct the
cabinets were not of the same high quality as those used in the display. In addition, the
cabinets had chatter, nicks, and inconsistent color stain. (Complaint 1f 9, Tf 11, R.3). In
response to complaints, on September 11, 1996, Russell Groomer and Mike O'Neal, both
employees of Mountain Tech, visited the plaintiffs' home. Both men assured the
plaintiffs that Mountain Tech would remedy the situation. (Complaint If 12, R. 3). After
receiving these assurances, Pollesche and Holmes allowed Mountain Tech to continue
installing the cabinets. (Complaint ^f 13, R.3).
187289.3
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On October 1, 1996, Mountain Tech delivered additional cabinets. These cabinets
were also inferior in both quality and workmanship to the cabinets in Mountain Tech's
showroom. The stain on these cabinets was much darker than the stain on those cabinets
previously delivered, and the cabinets were scratched and disfigured. (Complaint % 14,
R. 3). Pollesche and Holmes again complained about the quality, workmanship, and
construction of the cabinets. They also informed Mountain Tech that not all the cabinets
had been delivered on time, that approximately 62 handles had not been installed, and
that some of the doors to the cabinets did not fit (Complaint ^f 15, R. 4). Mountain Tech
informed the plaintiffs that it would not take any further corrective measures. (Complaint
Tfl6, R. 4). The plaintiffs refused to pay the balance due under the contract.
B.

The Litigation and Mountain Tech's Dilatory Tactics.

On October 30, 1997, the plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging breach of contract,
breach of warranty and fraud. (Complaint % 22, 27, 34, R. 6-8). Mountain Tech did not
timely respond to the plaintiffs' complaint. The trial court entered a default judgment on
December 22, 1997. (R. 12). Mountain Tech thereafter responded to the plaintiffs'
complaint on December 29, 1997. It filed an answer and counterclaim. (R. 18). The
counterclaim alleged breach of contract in the amount of $2,496.00, representing the
balance due on the contract. (R. 27). The default judgment was eventually set aside.
The court awarded plaintiffs' counsel nominal fees of $200.00 in connection with
obtaining the default judgment. (R. 104).
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During discovery, Mountain Tech was continually tardy in filing its responses,
resulting in the trial court awarding sanctions against it. Plaintiffs served interrogatories,
requests for admissions, and requests for production of documents on March 20, 1998.
(R. 147). Mountain Tech did not answer the discovery requests. (R. 180). Plaintiffs then
filed for summary judgment on June 8, 1998—based on Mountain Tech's complete
failure to answer discovery requests or advance any evidence disputing the alleged facts
(R. 134). Defendant responded to the motion five days after the required deadline—
including affidavits of Michael O'Neal and Russell Groomer which contradicted the
substance of the unanswered request for admissions. (R. 178, 180). The trial court
denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, but it imposed sanctions on
Mountain Tech for failing to comply with discovery and other procedural deadlines.
Among the sanctions, the court ordered that the defendant's responses to the plaintiffs'
request for admissions be stricken. (R. 273). In addition, the trial court awarded
plaintiffs' counsel $500.00 for being induced to bring the motion by Mountain Tech's
failure to contest the facts. (R. 274).
Although the trial court had warned that further discovery delays would not be
tolerated (R. 274), Mountain Tech again made an untimely request, this time to inspect
the plaintiffs' property. (R. 359). Plaintiffs' counsel objected to the untimely motion,
and was again awarded nominal fees in the amount of $200.00, although it granted the
tardy request. (R. 365; R. 391).
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The defendant moved for partial summary judgment on the fraud claim against
Russell Groomer, which motion was granted. (R. 530). The remaining allegations of
breach of contract and breach of warranty, along with the Defendant's counterclaim, were
submitted for trial. Although this is a relatively minor contract dispute, the jury trial
lasted four days. Eleven witnesses appeared. (R. 993, Table of Contents). Mountain
Tech called seven witnesses, four of whom were independent experts. (R. 993, Table of
Contents).
C.

The Attempt of Mountain Tech to Call Plaintiff Sheryl Holmes as a Rebuttal
Witness,

Sheryl Holmes was called by plaintiffs as part of their case in chief. During her
cross examination, counsel for Mountain Tech asked Ms. Holmes to compare the quality
of materials used in the showroom display to that of the cabinets that were installed in her
home. (R. 994, T. 233-34). Plaintiffs' counsel successfully objected to this line of
questioning on grounds of lack of foundation for her being able to make such a
comparison and on the grounds that it called for speculation. (R. 994, T. 234).
During its case in chief, the defense called its employee, Russell Groomer, to the
stand. (R. 995, T. 413). He testified about the quality of materials used in the
construction of the cabinets, and was specifically questioned about the quality of
materials in the showroom display. (R. 995, T. 424-37). Defendant also called another
employee, Mike O'Neal, who was also questioned extensively about the showroom
display, Sheryl Holmes' visits to the showroom, and the quality of materials used. (R.
996, T. 592-600).
187289.3
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Counsel for Mountain Tech then indicated that it intended to recall Sheryl Holmes
as a rebuttal witness to question her about the quality of materials used to construct the
cabinets in her home. (R. 996, T. 656-57). Plaintiffs' counsel again objected to this
testimony on the grounds of foundation, arguing that Ms. Holmes was not qualified to
discuss the materials. (R. 996, T. 657). Plaintiffs' counsel further objected that the
testimony would be cumulative as other defense witnesses had already discussed the
quality of materials and compared the cabinets in the home with those in the showroom
display. (R. 996, T. 657).
After hearing argument, the trial court determined that Sheryl Holmes could not be
called as a rebuttal witness for two reasons. First, the court found that the testimony
would be cumulative. (R. 996, T. 658). Second, the court found that Ms. Holmes lacked
foundation to testify on this issue because "she is not a carpenter [and] does not have
specific expertise and the ability to compare exactly what she may have viewed in the
display as to what was in her home..." (R. 996, T. 658). The trial judge further explained
his ruling by noting that Ms. Holmes would be "a lay witness" and "that there was even
among expert witnesses some disagreement as to what was and what was not standard
quality and standard building and construction materials of the cabinets." (R. 996, T.
658).
The jury awarded the plaintiffs $7,000.00 for breach of contract and $2,000.00 for
breach of warranty. The jury also found in favor of the plaintiffs on Mountain Tech's
counterclaim. (R. 721-22).
187289.3
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D.

The Attorney's Fees Application and Award.

After trial, plaintiffs' counsel submitted an application for award of attorney's fees
and non-taxable costs. This request was made pursuant to a combination of the provision
in the parties' contract that allowed recovery of attorney's fees by Mountain Tech, and a
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5, which grants a reciprocal right of recovery of attorney's
fees to the prevailing party in any action arising out of a contract allowing attorney fees
to one party. (R. 726).
Plaintiffs' counsel submitted a detailed affidavit outlining the calculation of his
fees as well as detailed billing statements, and a summary of the hourly rates charged by
plaintiffs' counsel, associates, and legal staff. (R. 735). (Affidavit of Bryon J.
Benevento, R. 733-79). Plaintiffs' counsel explicitly stated that the plaintiffs were "not
seeking fees and/or costs associated with the fraud claim originally asserted against
Russell Groomer." (R. 735). Therefore, plaintiffs' counsel deducted "one-third of the
cost associated in preparing the Complaint, the time spent to respond to defendant's
motion for summary judgment on the fraud claim, the time spent at hearings on
defendant's motions for summary judgment, and the time spent in preparing jury
instructions relating to the fraud claim." (R. 882). Fees were also reduced by $950.00 to
reflect sanctions paid by Mountain Tech, and taxable court costs were excluded as well.
(R. 735) After considering these deductions, plaintiffs' total request for attorney's fees
and costs amounted to $27,783.44. (R. 736).

187289.3
11/05/01

10

Defendant's counsel then filed an untimely memorandum opposing plaintiffs'
motion. (R. 876). Defendant also sought fees in the amount of $9,428.00 for its defense
of the fraud claim, or in the alternative, "89% or $16,752.00 of the fees charged [to
Mountain Tech by its counsel] as the jury's verdict awarded plaintiffs only 11% of the
prayed for relief." (R. 807). Defendant's counsel did not submit any billing statements
or affidavits to verify these fees were actually charged and did not provide an itemized
description of the services provided. (R. 801-08).
Judge Iwasaki issued a minute entry outlining his findings. He denied Mountain
Tech's request for fees and awarded plaintiffs $24,000.00 in attorney's fees. (R. 896).
Judge Iwasaki found that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover attorney's fees under the
contract provisions and the Utah statute allowing for reciprocal fees. (R. 896, ^f 2). He
also expressly considered the factors outlined by Dixie State Bank v. Bracken.
Specifically, he found:
[T]he court is of the opinion that the legal work was actually performed, that for
most part, it was reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter, that the
attorneys' billing rates were consistent with the rates customarily charged in the
locality for similar services, and that this was not a case that was overly
complicated, except for the need to respond and to compel defendants throughout
the litigation...."
(R. 894-95, % 4). He also noted that plaintiffs' fees were reasonable in that they were
comparable to the amount of fees charged by defense counsel. (R. 895, ^f 6).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court's decision to refuse to allow Sheryl Holmes to be called as a
rebuttal witness was appropriate and should be affirmed. The trial judge properly
187289.3
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determined that Ms. Holmes lacked foundation to testify regarding the quality of
materials used to construct the cabinets, and that her testimony would be cumulative
because the defense had already presented this evidence through other witnesses. Even
assuming the trial court's decision was in error, it was not harmful because there is no
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different if she had testified.
The trial court's decision to award the plaintiffs $24,000.00 in attorney's fees
should also be affirmed. Judge Iwasaki was presented with sufficient evidence and made
sufficient specific findings of fact to satisfy the standards set forth in Dixie State Bank v.
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988). Moreover, Mountain Tech's brief before this court
has failed to marshal the evidence supporting the trial judge's decision and, therefore, it
has not met its preliminary burden on appeal. Accordingly, the trial judge's award of
fees should be affirmed.
Finally, the trial court's decision to deny Mountain Tech's claim for attorney's
fees should be affirmed. Mountain Tech has no claim for recovery of fees under Utah
law. Alternatively, it has failed to properly preserve its claim for appeal.
Thus, the trial court's decisions on all issues should be affirmed. Plaintiffs further
request that they be awarded reasonable attorney's fees incurred in defending this appeal.
This award is available pursuant to Utah case law and the parties' contract.

187289.3
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ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Refusing to Allow Mountain
Tech to Recall Sheryl Holmes as a Rebuttal Witness.
In its brief, Mountain Tech contends that its counsel wished to recall Ms. Holmes

in order to question her about the quality of materials used to construct the cabinets in her
home, as well as the cost to repair the cabinets. (Appellant's Brief, 12-13). Plaintiffs'
counsel objected, and the trial judge sustained the objection, stating that the witness
lacked foundation and that the testimony would be cumulative. The trial court's decision
should be affirmed as being within the proper exercise of judicial discretion.
Trial courts are granted a considerable amount of latitude in determining whether
to admit testimony. A trial court's refusal to allow a rebuttal witness to testify is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and will not be overturned unless the decision
affected the outcome of the trial. Larsen v. Johnson, 958 P.2d 953, 958 (Utah Ct App.
1998). See also Green v. Louden 2001 UT 62, fl9; 29 P.3d 638, 644 ("We review
challenges to the admission of rebuttal testimony for abuse of discretion."); Utah R. Evid.
103 ("Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence
unless a substantial right of the party is affected...."). Therefore, Mountain Tech must
show not only that the trial court abused its discretion in denying its request to call Ms.
Holmes, but also that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been
different but for the error. Mountain Tech has failed to carry this burden.
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A.

Defendant Had Not Laid Sufficient Foundation to Warrant Sheryl
Holmes Testifying Regarding the Quality of Materials, and her
Testimony Would Have Been Cumulative.

The trial court's refusal to allow the defense to recall Ms. Holmes was correct for
several reasons. First, Ms. Holmes lacked foundation to testify as to the quality of
materials used to construct the cabinets. Second, Mountain Tech was able to question
other witnesses on this issue, and therefore Ms. Holmes testimony would have been
cumulative.
On the first point, Ms. Holmes lacked foundation to testify as to the quality of the
materials. As the court noted, Ms. Holmes "is not a carpenter [and] does not have
specific expertise and the ability to compare exactly what she may have viewed in the
display as to what was in her home..." (R. 996, T. 658). The trial judge further explained
that Ms. Holmes would be "a lay witness" and "that there was even among expert
witnesses some disagreement as to what was and what was not standard quality and
standard building and construction materials of the cabinets." (R. 996, T. 658).
Appellate courts have traditionally deferred to the trial judge's decision regarding
the "necessity of testimony and the qualifications of the witness...." Stagmeyer v.
Leatham Bros., Inc.. 20 Utah 2d 421, 425; 439 P.2d 279, 282 (1968). In this instance, the
trial judge made a rational and well-reasoned determination that Ms. Holmes lacked the
necessary foundation to testify about the materials, and rightfully denied her testimony as
a rebuttal witness.
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On the second point, the trial court correctly concluded that Ms. Holmes'
testimony would be cumulative. In the presentation of its defense, Mountain Tech called
several witnesses, including Russell Groomer and Mike O'Neal. Both men were
questioned extensively about the quality of materials used to construct the cabinets and
the plaintiffs' visit to Moxmtain Tech's showroom display. (R. 995, T. 424-37); (R. 996,
T. 592-600). Because the defense's own witnesses had akeady addressed these issues,
the trial court ruled that Ms. Holmes' testimony would be cumulative. Utah appellate
courts have recognized that evidence is considered cumulative and may be excluded if it
has already been admitted in another form. Dahnken v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420, 422
(Utah 1986) (documents were considered cumulative because their substance had akeady
been admitted through oral testimony). Thus, the trial court's decision to deny Ms.
Holmes' rebuttal testimony was clearly appropriate.
B.

Mountain Tech has Failed to Prove that the Trial Court's Decision was
Prejudicial and, therefore, any Error is Harmless.

Even if this court finds that the trial court erred in refusing to allow Ms. Holmes to
testify, the trial court should still be affirmed because Mountain Tech has failed to show
that had she testified, there is a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome at trial. Or,
in other words, that "the likelihood of a different outcome [is] sufficiently high to
undermine confidence in the verdict." Larsen v. Johnson, 958 P.2d 953, 958 (Utah Ct
App. 1998). Mountain Tech has failed to satisfy this standard.
In its brief, Mountain Tech argues that the trial court's refusal to allow Ms.
Holmes to testify constituted prejudicial error for two reasons. First, Mountain Tech
187289.3
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argues that if Ms. Holmes had been recalled, they could have questioned her about the
cost of repairing the cabinets and would have proven a lower damage amount. Second,
Mountain Tech argues that defense counsel could have gotten Ms. Holmes to testify that
the quality of materials used to construct the cabinets was the same as that in the
showroom. (Appellant's Brief, 14). Neither of these points is sufficient.
Mountain Tech's first argument is that Ms. Holmes would have testified that it
cost only $4,015.19 to repair the cabinets, an amount far lower than the damages
awarded. (Appellant's Brief, 14). The point is moot, however, because Mountain Tech
failed to properly raise this issue at trial and therefore has waived the argument on appeal.
At trial, Mountain Tech's counsel stated that it intended to call Ms. Holmes as a rebuttal
witness for purposes of comparing the cabinets in the display with those in her home. (R.
996, T. 656). Defense counsel never indicated to the court that Ms. Holmes would be
recalled to testify about the amount of damages. (R. 996, T. 656-658). Because defense
counsel has failed to properly present the issue to the trial judge in the first instance, the
point has not been preserved for appeal. Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99 ^[16, 17
P.3d 1110, 1115 (citing State v. Wetzel 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993) ("Parties claiming
error below and seeking appellate review have the duty and responsibility to support their
allegations with an adequate record.")
Mountain Tech also contends that Ms. Holmes would have testified "that the
cabinets she saw at the display in 1996 were of the same quality and materials as those
that were eventually installed in her home." (Appellant's Brief, 14). This simply is not
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true. Ms. Holmes has never given that testimony in the past, and also lacked the requisite
expertise to make that comparison at trial. At her deposition, Ms. Holmes was asked if
she inspected the displays, and she answered that she did not recall. (Deposition of
Sheryl Holmes, p. 59, lines 9-10. A partial copy of Ms. Holmes5 deposition is attached
hereto as an Addendum.) Despite Ms. Holmes' lack of knowledge, defense counsel
continued to ask questions about the display. Plaintiffs counsel objected several times to
this line of questioning on the grounds of foundation, as Ms. Holmes had never actually
identified the display. (Deposition of Sheryl Holmes, p. 45, lines 13-25; p. 51-52; p. 81,
lines 1-8).
Furthermore, Mountain Tech was able to extensively question several witnesses,
including both Russell Groomer and Mike O'Neal, regarding the materials used to
construct the cabinets, and put in evidence favorable to it. The jury thus considered this
evidence in rendering its verdict. (R. 995, T. 424-37); (R. 996, T. 592-600). The trial
court's decision was, at most, harmless error. Utah v. Stephens, 667 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah
1983) ("Where evidence is excluded by the trial court, any error which may have resulted
from such exclusion is cured where the substance of the evidence is later admitted
through some other means."); Dahnken, 726 P.2d at 422 (Utah 1986) (exclusion of
cumulative evidence admitted through oral evidence was at most harmless error).
Because Mountain Tech cannot show that any error in the trial court's ruling
undermines confidence in the verdict, the decision should be affirmed.
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EL

The Trial Court's Specific Findings and Award of Attorney's Fees to
Plaintiffs' Counsel Should be Affirmed.
A.

Plaintiffs Were Entitled to Attorney's Fees and Defendant Was Not.

Utah Law only allows recovery of attorney's fees pursuant to contract or statute.
Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assoc. 910 P.2d 1252, 1263 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). In this
case, the parties executed an agreement containing the following provision:
In event payments are not made as per contract provided herein, and in the event
Seller employs an attorney for the purpose of enforcing terms hereof, the Buyer
agrees to pay all costs of any such legal proceedings.
(R. 263). This provision only granted Mountain Tech a right to recover fees and costs in
the event of a breach. However, the plaintiffs have a reciprocal right, by virtue of Utah
Code Ann. Section 78-27-56.5 (2001), which reads:
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails in a civil
action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed
after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written contract,
or other writing allow at least one party to recover attorney's fees.
Thus, by virtue of the contract and Utah law, the prevailing party on a claim to enforce
the contract may be awarded attorney's fees.
Plaintiffs Pollesche and Holmes were clearly the prevailing party on the contract
claims in this action. The jury returned a special verdict awarding the plaintiffs
$7,000.00 for breach of contract and $2,000.00 for breach of warranty. The jury also
rejected Mountain Tech's counterclaim based on plaintiffs' non-payment of the final
installment. (R. 721-22).
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In its brief, Mountain Tech argues that it prevailed in its summary judgment
motion directed at the fraud claim. This argument is founded on a misperception of law.
Utah law only provides for attorney's fees pursuant to contract or statute. Common law
fraud claims do not arise out of a contract or statute, but rather are based on the tort
theory of intentional wrongdoing. Because fraud is an action in tort, attorney's fees for
the fraud claim could not be recovered regardless of which party prevailed. Foote v.
Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah 1998) (denying fees for tort-based actions). Accordingly,
the sole issue concerning the propriety of plaintiffs' attorney's fee award is whether it
was appropriate in amount.
B.

The Trial Court Properly Determined that an Award of $24,000 in
Attorney's Fees was Appropriate.

The trial court's decision to award plaintiffs' counsel $24,000.00 in attorney's fees
should be affirmed. The lead Utah case on attorney's fees is Dixie State Bank v.
Bracken, which sets forth four factors that the trial court should consider when awarding
attorney's fees. Factors include the following:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

What legal work was actually performed?
How much of the legal work performed was reasonably necessary to
adequately prosecute the matter?
Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rate customarily charged in
locality for similar services? and
Are there circumstances which require consideration of additional factors?

Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 990. A trial court has "broad discretion in determining
what constitutes a reasonable fee" and the appellate court will review the trial court's
findings on the four Dixie State Bank criteria under an abuse of discretion standard.
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Dixie State Bank v. Branken, 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988). Moreover, the appellate
courts will uphold the trial court's decision "even if it failed to make findings on the
record whenever it would be reasonable to assume that the court actually made such
findings." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 317 (Utah 1998) (quoting State v.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 788 n.6 (Utah 1991)).1
1.

The Trial Court Entered Specific Findings of Fact and there is
Sufficient Evidence to Support the Ruling.

By minute entry, Judge Iwasaki issued specific findings on the four Dixie State
Bank factors. Paragraph 4 of the judge's ruling reads as follows:
Turning to the factors regarding attorney's fees as set forth in Dixie State Bank v.
Bracken, [1] the Court is of the opinion that the legal work was actually
performed, [2] that for the most part, it was reasonably necessary to adequately
prosecute the matter, [3] that the attorneys' billing rates were consistent with the
rates customarily charged in the locality for similar services, and [4] that this was
not a case that was overly complicated, except for the need to respond and to
compel defendants throughout litigation.... (R. 895) (bracketed material added.)
There was ample evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that the Dixie
State Bank factors were satisfied. First, there has never been any dispute that the legal
services were actually performed. In its fee application, the plaintiffs' counsel submitted
its billing statements as well as a detailed affidavit outlining the calculation of fees.
(Affidavit of Bryon J. Benevento, R. 733-79). The billing statements contained a detailed
description of the time spent, hourly rates charged, and services provided. (R. 738-79).
1

While Mountain Tech has challenged the award of attorney's fees, it has not raised any argument on
appeal as to reasonableness of the amount of the fees. Moreover, the fact that Mountain Tech's counsel
charged its client almost $20,000 in legal fees indicates that the total fees charged by plaintiffs' counsel
were reasonable and comparable to local standards. (R. 895). However, plaintiffs address the
reasonableness question out of an abundance of caution.
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Second, the court properly concluded that "for the most part" the legal work was
reasonably necessary to prosecute this matter. Much of the work in this case was in
response to defense counsel's tactics. Defense counsel repeated ignored discovery
deadlines, received several sanctions from the court, and designated nine separate
witnesses to testify at trial despite the fact that this was a relatively simple contract
dispute. Among the trial court's findings, the judge noted that the plaintiffs were
required "to respond and to compel defendants throughout the litigation...." (R. 895).
The trial court did, however, reduce the plaintiffs' requested attorney's fees from
$27,783.44 to $24,000.00. The trial court also noted that plaintiffs' fees seemed quite
reasonable when compared to those charged by defense counsel. The court also noted
that defense counsel had also charged his client approximately $20,000.00 in fees as well.
(R. 895).
Third, the court correctly concluded that the billing rates charged to the plaintiffs
were consistent with the rates customarily charged in the locality for similar services.
The trial court carefully scrutinized the rates and made specific findings regarding the
rates charged. In particular, the court noted that "some of the work done by the associates
was billed at a lower rate."
Finally, the trial court found that there were additional circumstances which
required consideration in fixing the amount of fees. Among other items, the trial judge
noted the "contentious history of this litigation" and plaintiffs' need "to compel
defendants throughout the litigation." (R.895) The Utah Supreme Court has routinely
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upheld the trial judge's decision regarding the amount of attorney's fees awarded,
especially when there is evidence that opposing counsel has delayed litigation. Dixie
State Bank, 764 P.2d at 991 (finding opposing counsel's litigation strategy was
appropriately considered as it complicated a routine case). Similarly, Utah courts have
recognized that the trial court is generally "in a better position than an appellate court to
gauge the quality and efficiency of the representation and the complexity of the
litigation." Richard Barton Enter., Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 380 (Utah 1996).
2.

There is Sufficient Evidence from which this Court may Infer
that the Trial Court made Sufficient Findings of Fact.

As discussed above, the trial court made specific findings of fact regarding the
award of attorney's fees and the factors outlined by Dixie State Bank. More importantly,
even if these findings were deemed insufficient because the judge stated them in
conclusory terms, there is sufficient evidence from which this court could infer those
findings. Under Utah law, an appellate court will uphold the trial court's ruling "even if
it failed to make findings on the record whenever it would be reasonable to assume that
the court actually made such findings." Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 316 (quoting State v.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 788 n.6 (Utah 1991)). In this case, plaintiffs' counsel submitted
both a detailed affidavit and billing statements and also discussed the Dixie State Bank
factors in its memoranda. (R. 878). Because this evidence was before the trial court, this
court can easily and appropriately infer that the trial court made sufficient findings of
fact.
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In its brief, Mountain Tech discusses in detail Foote v: Clark, 962 P.2d 52 (Utah
1998) and Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assoc, 910 P.2d 1252 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Neither case is inconsistent with the trial court's ruling. In Foote, the fees were
necessarily reduced because the moving party sought fees for tort-based actions, which
are not recoverable under Utah law. Foote, 962 P.2d at 56. In the case at hand, however,
plaintiffs' counsel has not attempted to recover fees for its fraud claim, so no additional
reduction of the award is required.
Similarly, in Selvage, counsel submitted an uncontroverted application for
attorney's fees. On its own initiative and without a motion from opposing counsel, the
trial court reduced the requested attorney's fees from $175,000.00 to $42,500.00, without
any explanation. Selvage, 910 P.2d at 1263. This court rightfully held that the trial court
must "explain the basis for its sua sponte reduction" of an uncontroverted fee. Id. at
1265.
Selvage does not conflict with the trial court's decision below for several reasons.
First, the trial court did not make a drastic reduction or increase in the amount of fees
requested. Plaintiffs counsel requested $27,783.44 in attorney's fees, and this amount
was reduced to $24,000.00 after the trial court compared plaintiffs' fees with those
charged by opposing counsel Second, the trial court made sufficient findings of fact on
the record to support its award, including a discussion of the complexity of the litigation
and the need to compel opposing counsel. Further, even if these findings were deemed
insufficient, the plaintiffs' counsel presented sufficient evidence below in the form of
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affidavits and billing statements, from which the trial court could have made the requisite
findings. Accordingly, this court should affirm the trial court's decision to award
plaintiffs' counsel $24,000 in attorney's fees.
C.

Mountain Tech has Not Properly Challenged the Trial Court Findings.

This Court should also affirm the trial court's decision to award plaintiffs' counsel
$24,000.00 in attorney's fees because Mountain Tech has failed to meet its burden on
appeal. In its brief, Mountain Tech argues that the trial court's findings were conclusory,
and that the trial judge failed to allocate the fees awarded among the successful and
unsuccessful claims. Not only are these allegations unfounded, but Mountain Tech has
failed to properly bring its challenge under Utah case law.
Under Utah law, "to successfully challenge a trial court's findings, an appellant
must first marshal all the evidence that supports the trial court's findings. .. . After
marshaling the supporting evidence, the appellant must show that, even when viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, the evidence is insufficient to
support the trial court's findings." Utah v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, 1 P.3d 1108, 1112
(citing Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312). Moutain Tech has failed to carry this
burden.
As previously discussed, the trial court not only made specific findings of fact as
required by Dixie State Bank, but also took note of several facts which would support its
ruling. For example, the trial judge considered the amount charged by defense counsel in
determining whether the total fees were reasonable and even reduced the plaintiffs'
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requested attorney's fees. Similarly, in issuing its ruling, the trial judge considered
plaintiffs' billing statements, which precisely outline the time spent on each matter, the
rate charged, and the services provided. (R. 735). Mountain Tech has failed to marshal
this evidence, and other evidence, which supports the trial court's ruling.
In addition, Mountain Tech has again placed undue emphasis on the dismissed
fraud claim, contending that the trial court has failed to allocate the fees awarded between
the successful and unsuccessful claims. This simply is not true. The plaintiffs never
requested fees for the fraud claim, and accordingly, fees for the fraud claim were never
awarded. In its fee application, plaintiffs' counsel explicitly stated that the plaintiffs were
"not seeking fees and/or costs associated with the fraud claim originally asserted against
Russell Groomer." (R. 735). Moreover, plaintiffs' counsel deducted ccone-third of the
cost associated in preparing the Complaint, the time spent to respond to defendant's
motion for summary judgment on the fraud claim, the time spent at hearings on
defendant's motions for summary judgment, and the time spent in preparing jury
instructions relating to the fraud claim." (R. 882). After these deductions were
accounted for, plaintiffs requested attorney's fees in the amount of $27,783.44. (R. 736).
This evidence was available to the trial court in rendering its decision, and trial
judge was fully aware that plaintiffs' counsel had deducted its fees incurred in bringing
the fraud claim. A simple review of the plaintiffs' billing statements could easily verify
that these amounts were indeed deducted. Mountain Tech has failed to bring this
evidence to the attention of this court. This Court should affirm the trial court's decision.
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EH.

The Trial Court Properly Denied Mountain Tech's Application for Attorney's Fees
A.

The Trial Court's Decision to Deny Mountain Tech Attorney's Fees Should
be Affirmed as Mountain Tech has No Basis for Recovery Under Utah Law.

Mountain Tech has argued that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
award Mountain Tech attorney's fees. However, Mountain Tech has no basis for
recovering its fees under Utah law. Therefore, the trial court's decision should be
affirmed.
It is well-established that under Utah law, attorney's fees may only be recovered
pursuant to contract or statute. Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 117 (Utah
1998); Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988); Selvage v. J.J.
Johnson & Assoc. 910 P.2d 1252, 1263 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). This case initially
involved a total of four claims: (1) plaintiffs' claim for breach of contract; (2) plaintiffs'
claim for breach of warranty; (3) plaintiffs' fraud claim; and (4) Mountain Tech's
counterclaim for breach of contract. Plaintiffs do not dispute the fact that Mountain was
successful in dismissing the fraud claim on summary judgment. However, there is no
basis for recovering attorney's fees arising from the fraud claim.
The fraud claim is distinct from the other claims since it does not arise out of the
contract, but rather is based on the tort theory of intentional wrongdoing. Utah statute
does not provide for recovery of attorney's fees in common law tort actions, and
Mountain Tech has cited no authority indicating that such an award would be appropriate.
Because fraud is an action in tort, attorney's fees for the fraud claim could not be
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recovered regardless of which party prevailed on the issue. Fpote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52,
56 (Utah 1998) (denying fees for tort-based actions).
Mountain Tech's desire to collect attorney's fees on the fraud claim is not only
without legal support, but to permit such an award would be bad policy. Plaintiffs
Pollesche and Holmes were clearly the victims in this lawsuit. Mountain Tech sold the
plaintiffs a shoddy product, then refused to correct the problem. Moreover, Mountain
Tech continuously hindered the litigation process. (R. 880). The jury verdict provides
conclusive proof that Mountain Tech was at fault. However, because this is a contract
dispute, the plaintiffs were awarded only $9000.00 in damages, with no ability to obtain
punitive damages. Plaintiffs also paid their attorneys over $29,000 in fees and costs. (R.
880).
The reality of this situation is that unless this court both affirms the lower court's
decision to deny Mountain Tech attorney's fees, and affirms the award of plaintiffs' fees,
the plaintiffs will lose money in this lawsuit and will be unable to remedy the defective
cabinets that caused this litigation. Such a result would be unfair, contrary to the jury's
verdict, and would effectively discourage any ordinary person from seeking relief in the
courts over a minor contract dispute. Accordingly, Mountain Tech's argument for fees
should be rejected.
B.

Mountain Tech has Failed to Preserve its Claim for Appeal.

Alternatively, Mountain Tech should be denied attorney's fees on the fraud claim
because it has failed to properly preserve its claim for appeal. "A party who is entitled to
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attorneys fees and costs and fails to ask for all of them in the trial phase of the case, or
fails to adduce adequate evidence in support of a finding of reasonable attorney's fees,
waives any right to claim those fees later." Meadowbrook, 959 P.2d at 117.
Mountain Tech's application for fees was untimely, factually insufficient, and failed to
comply with Utah law. Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine. 803 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah 1999) (attorney's
fee affidavit should describe the legal services performed, together with the time spent for each
service, and rate charged). Defendants' counsel submitted only a blanket affidavit requesting
$19,240.00 in attorney's fees and $1,514.14 in taxable costs. (R. 795) Defense counsel has
never submitted any billing statements to verify its fees were actually charged, and has not
provided any description of the services performed. (R. 801-08). It is, at best, ironic that
Mountain Tech has advocated that this court should judiciously scrutinize plaintiffs' award of
attorney's fees, while Mountain Tech itself has failed to comply with the most basic of
evidentiary requirements in requesting its own fees. The trial court has properly denied
Mountain Tech's application and this decision should be affirmed.
IV.

Fees on Appeal.
Plaintiffs Pollesche and Holmes respectfully request that this court award the

attorney's fees incurred in defending this appeal, evidence of which will be submitted
following decision. Pursuant to Utah law and the parties contract, plaintiffs are entitled
to reasonable attorney's fees incurred on appeal. Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959
P.2d 115, 120 (Utah 1998).
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the trial court's decision to refuse
to allow the defense to recall Sheryl Holmes as a rebuttal witness, its award of attorney's
fees to plaintiffs in the amount of $24,000.00, and its denial of fees to Mountain Tech.
The record on all three issues demonstrates that the trial court made sufficient findings of
fact to support its ruling and, accordingly, its decision should be affirmed. Additionally,
Plaintiffs request that they be awarded reasonable attorney's fees incurred in defending
this appeal.
DATED this 6th day of November, 2001.
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P.

BryonX R&ievent^)
Attorney/for Appellees
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CASE NUMBER:
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DEPOSITION OF:
SHERYL HOLMES
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September 10,
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1999

REPORTED BY:
Mary D. Quinn
CSR, RPR, CRR

Defendants,

The Deposition of SHERYL HOLMES, taken on
behalf of the Defendants, at 4800 South 150 West,
Murray, Utah on September 10, 1999 as reported by
MARY D. QUINN, Certified Shorthand Reporter,
Registered Professional Reporter, Certified Realtime
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State
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EXAMINATION BY MR. WATTS
1

but I'm sure they can do it.

2
3
4

MR. WATTS:

Just if we can obtain the front

and back, that may clarify some things.
Q

In your Complaint, the basis of this suit

5

in general terms as I understand it, Sheryl, is that

6

you believe that the cabinets that were constructed

7

and installed into your home were not of the same

8

quality as the cabinets that -- and materials that

9

are on display.

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

Correct?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

The display you're referring to are the

14

displays at Mountain Tech Mill and Cabinet, correct?

15

A

Correct.

16

Q

And specifically, the display that is

17

mounted in the room we are in -- I'm going to ask you

18

and ask Bryan to go to that display and tell me

19

specifically how you believe that this display

20

cabinet is different from the cabinets that are

21

installed in your home.

22

MR. BENEVENTO:

We're not going to do that.

23

You haven't established the foundation and she

24

doesn't have the foundation to say this is the

25

mock-up that she used to rely upon.
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EXAMINATION
1

A

BY MR.

Not necessarily.

WATTS

Sometimes

I remember

2

things by other dates in the D a y - T i m e r s .

3

recall when the sub-zero was

4
5

Q

Okay.

Day-Timer for

delivered.

Do you still have those -- the

1996?

6

A

I would have to check.

7

Q

Will you do so?

8

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

9

MR. WATTS:

10
11

I do not

Let's take a break.

(Whereupon a recess was
MR. W A T T S :

taken.)

Back on the record.

While

12

were off the record, I placed a phone call to

13

Iwasaki, spoke to his clerk Janet.

14

quick lunch, was not

15

we

Judge

The judge is on a

available.

I was explaining to Mr. Benevento that

16

scope of my examination

17

the claimed deficiencies in the cabinets installed

18

the plaintiff's home in relation to the

19

display at Mountain Tech Mill and Cabinet.

20

Benevento has

21

I've

in large part will

the

focus

in

cabinet
Mr.

objected.
inquired as to whether he wishes

22

continue with his objection.

23

to notice up a hearing before Judge Iwasaki.

24

that correctly

25

upon

to

If so, then we'll

have

Does

state --

MR. BENEVENTO:

Somewhat.

Three i s s u e s , if
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EXAMINATION BY MR* WATTS
1

we're going to be on the record.

2

object to the line of questioning because there's

3

been no foundation that this particular cabinet that

4

he now wants Miss Holmes to inspect was indeed the

5

cabinet display that she inspected and is the subject

6

matter of the Complaint*

7

First one is that I

Second of all, I don't think it's appropriate

8

to suspend the deposition solely on that issue*

9

think you are incumbent to, under Rule 1 and 2 of the

10

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to expedite the

11

discovery process and complete the rest of your

12

questions and reserve this particular issue for

13

hearing if, indeed, we go forward.

14

And so I would request that you reconsider

15

suspending at this point and completing the

16

deposition other than that subject matter.

17

I

And number three is I haven't had a chance to

18

talk to my client to explain to her the burden of

19

coming back a second time in light of the judge's

20

unavailability.

21

have me respond on the record based upon my inability

22

to talk to her about those risks.

23

So I don't think it's appropriate to

MR. WATTS:

You're welcome to take a few

24

minutes and allow Mr. Benevento an opportunity to

25

talk to Miss Holmes so that can be explained.
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EXAMINATION BY MR. WATTS
is, as reiterated by your attorney, is that you do
not have an independent recollection as to whether
this was the cabinet design or the cabinets that you
viewed in 1996?

Is that an accurate representation?

MR. BENEVENTO:

Let the record reflect that

Mr. Watts is pointing at a particular display within
what's called the marble showroom.
MR. WATTS:

Cherry wood cabinets.

THE WITNESS:

I do not know if that was the

mock display that I looked at.
MR. WATTS:
that.

Okay.

Let me come back to

You've alleged in your Complaint a series of

perceived deficiencies.

Where did I put it?

MR. BENEVENTO:

They're in the affidavit as

(BY MR. WATTS)

When you say that there

well.
Q

are open joints at the top of the cabinet ends, what
specifically are you referring to?

Are you

referring -- when you say cabinet ends, what are the
cabinet ends you're referring to?
A

Some of these items you'll have to go

through with Sig.
Q

Okay.

That's one I'll let you ask him.
So you don't -- as it relates to the

Complaint, you don't have any personal knowledge as
to -- personal opinion as to what --.
59
MARY D. QUINN CSR, RPR, CRR
(801) 328-1188

